I have the honour to speak on behalf of the European Union. The following countries align themselves with this statement: Türkiye§, North Macedonia*, Montenegro*, Albania*, Bosnia and Herzegovina*, Iceland+, Liechtenstein+, Norway+, Ukraine, the Republic of Moldova and San Marino.
The European Union would like to thank the Director General for his report contained in document GOV/2022/24, and Deputy Director General Aparo for the technical briefing on 1 June 2022.
The EU reiterates its resolute commitment to and continued support for the full and effective implementation of the JCPOA and is determined to continue working with the international community to preserve this agreement of strategic importance for the global nuclear non-proliferation architecture. The EU calls on all countries to support its implementation in line with United Nations Security Council Resolution 2231 (2015).
The EU supports the intensive diplomatic efforts within the JCPOA Joint Commission and the contacts of the EU High Representative as JCPOA Coordinator with all relevant partners to achieve a return to the JCPOA by the United States and the resumption of full implementation of all JCPOA commitments by the United States and Iran. Full and verified implementation of Iran’s nuclear-related commitments will enable the international community to receive the necessary assurances.
The EU acknowledges the issues connected to the unilateral withdrawal of the United States from the JCPOA and the reimposition of sanctions by it. Alongside the verified full implementation by Iran of its nuclear-related commitments, the lifting of nuclear-related sanctions is an essential part of the agreement. The EU has fully upheld its commitments, including sanctions lifting under the JCPOA.
The EU is deeply concerned that Iran, while negotiating the return to full implementation of the JCPOA, has undertaken a series of actions inconsistent with the JCPOA, with severe and, in certain cases, irreversible proliferation implications. These actions, which make such a return more difficult, include:
- continued accumulation of enriched uranium, far beyond the JCPOA thresholds for quantity and level of enrichment, including alarming quantities of material at 20%, as well as at 60% which is of particular proliferation concern;
- continued installation, testing and accumulation of uranium with additional IR-1 and advanced centrifuges;
- further expansion of the centrifuge rotor tubes and bellows manufacturing capacity while IAEA has no access to full monitoring and verification;
- production and irradiation of high and low enriched uranium targets.
We recall our grave concern with the significant work on uranium metal previously reported, including uranium enriched up to 20%, and associated irreversible knowledge gains. We therefore call on Iran not to commence any further work related to the conversion of UF6 to UF4 for the production of uranium metal and not to resume work on the production of uranium metal.
Some of these actions do not have any plausible civilian justification in the context of Iran’s declared nuclear programme.
We are deeply concerned that, from 23 February 2021 onwards, the Agency’s verification and monitoring activities have been seriously affected as a result of Iran’s decision to stop the implementation of transparency measures as envisaged in the JCPOA, including the Additional Protocol. The Agency has been deprived of an essential part of its knowledge of Iran’s activities on the entirety of Iran’s nuclear fuel cycle. Iran’s decision seriously restricted IAEA’s ability to verify that nuclear material and activities in Iran remain for exclusively peaceful purposes. We urge Iran to implement all transparency measures, so that the Agency is in a position to resume the necessary verification and monitoring activities in relation to the JCPOA, which is indispensable for the continuity of knowledge.
We strongly urge Iran to refrain from any further escalatory steps, to reverse all activities inconsistent with the JCPOA and return, without any further delay, to its full implementation, including of all transparency measures. This, together with full implementation of the CSA, including modified Code 3.1 to its subsidiary arrangements, and immediate provisional application pending earliest ratification of the Additional Protocol is essential to help building international confidence in the exclusively peaceful nature of Iran’s nuclear programme. Timely and full cooperation with the IAEA remains absolutely crucial.
Preserving the Agency’s technical capability to restore and maintain continuity of knowledge for its verification and monitoring of Iran’s nuclear-related commitments in the future remains essential. We take note of the Agency’s understanding that all monitoring and surveillance data continues to be stored and will be made available to the Agency if and when Iran resumes implementation of its nuclear commitments under the JCPOA. We urge Iran to ensure full implementation of the monitoring arrangements agreed with the IAEA.
The EU expresses its strong support to and commends the Director General and the Secretariat for their professional, objective and impartial work and wholly supports the IAEA’s efforts to continue implementing its long-term mission of continued verification and monitoring in Iran. We welcome Member States’ extra budgetary support to IAEA’s mission in Iran.
The EU takes note of the Director General’s report and requests that it be made public.
Thank you, Chair.
§ Candidate Country
* Candidate Countries North Macedonia, Montenegro and Albania as well as potential Candidate Country Bosnia and Herzegovina continue to be part of the Stabilisation and Association Process.
+ Iceland, Liechtenstein and Norway are members of the EFTA and of the European Economic Area.